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Climate Change -The EU Approach for Kyoto 1.  Introduction 
On 3 March 1997 the EU Environment Council adopted a negotiating position on climate 
change that, inter alia, established a quantified emission reduction objective for inclusion 
in the  Community's protocol proposal to  the UN Framework Convention on Climate 
Change  (UNFCCC).  This  proposal  sets  a  15%  reduction  of emissions  for  three 
greenhouse gases carbon dioxide (C02 ), methane, (CH4), and nitrous oxide (N20  ) by 
2010, individually or jpintly, compared to  1990 for all industrialised countries that are 
parties to the Convention. At the 19/20 June Environment Council, Ministers also agreed 
to include in the ED's negotiating proposal an intermediate reduction objective of  at least 
7.5%  for  2005.  The  EU  position  covers  an average  reduction  for  a  basket of three 
greenhouse gases. At this stage no decision has been taken on specific targets for the three 
gases. 
The EU position in the negotiations has been widely debated both inside the EU and at 
the international level, particularly among other industrialized countries. Reactions have 
varied  widely  from  positive  recognition  of an  ambitious  policy  to  over  sceptical 
questioning of the technical, economic or political feasibility of the targets and in some 
cases outright opposition. 
This Communication seeks to place the EU negotiating position in an overall context and 
is  designed to  show both that it is technically feasible .  and that within a  sound policy 
framework  it is  economically  manageable  to  arrive  at a  reduction of greenhouse  gas 
emissions of 15% by the year 2010 despite the underlying upward trend. The targets were 
agreed because of  their environmental necessity and on the basis of studies showing that 
the targets are technically and economically feasible using in the main currently available 
technologies  and  practices.  These  targets  are  based  on  the  assumption  that  other 
industrialised countries will make comparable commitments. It is  also recognized that 
implementing the targets will be politically challenging. 
The EU negotiation position covers a basket of three greenhouse gases. By far the most 
important of these is C02  ,  responsible for approximately 80 % of the impact when !he 
gases  are  weighted  according  to  their  so-called  "global  warming  potential".  C02 
emissions are also the most difficult to reduce since, unlike other emissions arising from 
fossil fuel  use such as NOx and S02,  there are as yet no end of pipe solutions for C02• 
Business-as-usual scenarios for CI-14 and N20  indicate a likely reduction of  emissions and 
the possibility even for a significant reduction. This implies that a cost-effective reduction 
of the overall emission of the three gases might include a higher reduction of CI-14  and 
N20  emissions than 15 % and a lower reduction than 15 % for C02• However, because of 
the high relative weight of C02  it will still be necessary to achieve a reduction of C02 
above 1  0% in order to meet a 15 % overall target. 
For these reasons the focus of this Communication is on C02 emission reductions. The 
special circumstances concerning the other two gases are dealt with in chapter  6. 
A Commission Staff Working Paper prepared in parallel with this Communication sets 
out a fuller technical and economic justification underlying the EU negotiation position 
and explains in greater detail where the necessary reductions in greenhouse gas emission 
2 are expected to take place, the likely economic impact of the measures and the possible 
instruments to implement the policies. This paper also outlines a number of  EU proposals 
already on the table which,  when adopted, will facilitate  limitations and reductions  in 
greenhouse gas emissions. 
This  Communication examines the  2010 EU  negotiating position which has  been the 
focus of  international debate and is also more important in a long-term climate strategy. It 
is essential to bear in mind that the core of  any strategy to protect the global climate aims 
at a significant switch from the long-term trend for greenhouse gases to increase globally 
to a significant decrease. This requires action now with the benefits spread over a longer 
time frame. 
2.  Why is action necessary now? 
The First Conference of the Parties to  the Framework .Convention on Climate Change, 
held  in  Berlin  in  April  1995,  decided  to  initiate  negotiations  on  the  necessary 
commitments for industrialized countries to limit and reduce greenhouse gas emissions in 
the years after 2000. The EU was always a strong supporter of the Berlin Mandate. The 
Second  Assessment  Report  from  the  Inter-governmental  Panel  on  Climate  Change  ( 
IPCC), published early  1996, has confirmed the view, already held by the EU, that it is 
urgent to initiate the necessary changes in production and consumption patterns that will 
allow the long-term reduction of global greenhouse gas emissions necessary to meet the 
long term objective of the Climate Convention. The EU has recognised that failure to do 
so could have potentially damaging effects in the long-term since society needs to have a 
realistic time frame for change to take place in an open and transparent way. 
Whereas the negotiations on the Climate Convention in the early nineties were based on 
the precautionary principle (action may be needed even in the absence of the final proof 
of  the damage), the Second Assessment Report goes a step further by acknowledging that 
the  "balance of scientific  evidence  suggests  that  there  is  a  discernible  anthropogenic 
influence on the  global  climate".  The  global  problems associated with climate change 
could  have  a  substantial  negative  impact  on  global  agricultural  production  and 
productivity, reduce biological diversity, lead to land loss and population displacement 
and  increase  a  number  of vector-borne  diseases.  The  damages  are  likely  to  be 
proportionately more significant for the developing countries. 
It is  important  to  underline  that  the  scientific  evidence  of climate  change  (including 
research  reported  in,  or  initiated  after  the  second  IPCC  Second  Assessment  Report) 
indicates that unacceptable social, economic and ecological impacts could occur in the 
coming decades. This calls for a precautionary approach. Moreover, much of  the expected 
/  negative  impact  of climate  change  is  likely  to  occur  in  countries  that  have  only 
marginally  contributed to  causing  the  problem  and  without  the  financial  resources  to 
compensate  for  any  possible  damage.  If industrialised  countries  do  not  act  now  to 
mitigate climate change future  generations will not only be confronted with the cost of 
climate change impacts but the economic costs associated with limiting emissions could 
be much greater since there will be less time to make the adjustment. 
3 A particular reason to initiate early action on C02 emission reductions is the long lead 
time necessary before policy decisions show their full  impact on the  emissions.  Many 
"traditional"  environmental  problems  offer relatively  fast  end-of-pipeline  solutions  or 
modifications of existing  technology:  reducing  so2  emissions,  eliminating  lead  from 
gasoline or phasing out ofCFC's. This is not the case for C02 
Since C02 emissions are inherently linked to use of fossil fuels (coal, oil, gas) and since 
no economical removal technology exists as yet, the only way to reduce C02 emissions is 
through modification of  structures, processes, equipment and behaviour which directly or 
indirectly  use  fossil  fuels.  Because  of the  very  long  lifetime  of investments  in  the 
transport and energy sector and because of the relatively long  lifetime of many energy 
consuming goods  (cars, refrigerators, etc.)  a C02  emission strategy will  need  a  much 
longer horizon for implementation than for most other environmental problems. 
As chapter 7 explains, early action by industrialised countries is also a prerequisite for 
limiting the growth in greenhouse gas emissions from developing countries. The latter is 
a development that is expected to be increasingly important in coming years. 
3.  Possibilities to reduce COz emissions. 
All  C02  emission reduction possibilities  have  a co'st  impact and  the  more  society  is 
prepared to pay, the greater the range of reduction possibilities. In this Communication, 
among  the  actions  to  reduce  greenhouse  gas  emissions  either  through  investments 
incorporating  existing  efficient  technologies  or  the  application  of  new  technical 
approaches and practices, only those that can be expected to be politically acceptable are 
considered. In this context such reduction possibilities must not be excessively costly and 
should not have unacceptable social and distributional effects. These emission reduction 
possibilities have been the subject of numerous studies in recent years and how to realise 
this  potential  has  been  an  essential  part  of the  preparations  within  the  EU  for  the 
negotiations of  a climate protocol. 
For the analysis of the reduction possibilities in the various sectors of the EU economy 
the pre-Kyoto scenario in Table I is used as a reference. It assumes an 8% increase in total 
CO~ emissions  by  2010  compared  to  1990  provided  no  additional  new measures  are 
taken. 
Table I - Sectoral Distribution of  C02 emissions in EU - Mtonnes 
Sector/year  1990  2010  %inc/dec 
Transport  743  1032  +39% 
Industry  626  532  -15% 
Energy Industry  141  158  + 12% 
Domestic/Tertiary  654  680  +  4% 
Electricity/Heat  1036  1057  +  2% 
Production 
Total emissions  3200  3459  +  8% 
Source:  Pre-Kyoto  scenano  based  on  Eurostat  data  (Excludes  mternatlonal  marine 
bunkers but includes international air transport) 
4 Table I shows that it will be important to address the transport sector where the inherent 
tendency to continuous strong growth will pose a challenge for the achievement of any 
emission reduction target. Table I shows a 39 % increase in C02 emissions from transport 
between 1990 and 2010, much of which will come from road and air transport. In this 
context, it should be noted that because energy prices to end-users in the transport sector 
are generally higher than elsewhere in the economy, targeted action aimed at removing 
existing market failures  and inefficiencies in transport  is  required  to  significantly  cut 
emissions at low costs. 
The  Council  has  already  adopted  a  C02  emisson  target  which  corresponds  to  an 
improvement in the average fuel economy of new cars in the market in the order of 30% 
by  2005,  over today's average.  Future  fuel  use is  not  fully  taken into  account at the 
moment of vehicle purchase.  However, vehicle fuel  economy can be improved at lqw 
cost with available technology. To this end, the Commission is currently discussing with 
the  automobile  industry the  possibility of an effective  and  transparent environmental 
agreement in which the industry would commit itself to reducing the C02 emissions from 
cars.  Other elements of the strategy are fiscal  measures and fuel  economy labelling to 
influence the vehicle market. 
The uncompleted internal market in rail and the existing barriers to intermodal transport 
are other examples of transport inefficiencies whose removal would also imply low cost 
energy savings. The Commission has already proposed several measures to address these 
issues. For example, the liberalisation and revitalisation of the Community's railways is 
expected  to  bring  down  transport  costs  and  enhance  service  quality  in  rail,  thereby 
attracting traffic that currently goes by road. Similarly, the implementation of  the action 
programme  proposed  by  the  Commission  in  its· Communications  on  the  Citizens.' 
Network about Improving Public Transport and on Freight Intermodality should lead to a 
greater use being made of  alternatives to road and air transport. 
Finally,  measures  to  improve  transport  pricing  proposed  by  the  Commission  should 
enhance transport efficiency, both within and across modes. 
Although it is clear that these policy approaches require significant adjustments in the 
transport  system,  their  implementation  would  hold  out  the  prospect  of  major 
environmental, transport and economic benefits. The Commission is establishing a report 
on a strategy for the reduction in the growth of C02  emissions from transport that will be 
adopted in the near future. 
The industrial sector is characterized by very different energy intensity ratios and C02 
emissions from one sub-sector to another. In· general, the most energy intensive sectors, 
/ particularly those exposed to  international  competition,  already  pay close attention to 
energy efficiency for sound economic reasons, notably lower final energy prices effaced 
by international  competitors.  For other industrial  sectors  a  number of market barriers 
together with the low world energy prices which have applied for  more than  10  years 
have pushed the  issue  down the  list  of priorities.  Even  though  direct  industrial  C02 
emissions are becoming relatively less important in  overall emissions there is evidence 
from several Member States that these can still be further reduced in most sectors. The 
Dutch experience of an  approximately  2%  annual  increase  in  energy  efficiency  since 
5 1990, achieved in the framework of  negotiated agreements is particularly  convincing  m 
this context.  ·  · 
The role of  the electricity sector in meeting the challenge of  climate change is a key one. 
This is recognized by both the electricity supply industry, Member States' authorities and 
the Commission.  The Commission's services have completed an in-depth review with 
Eurelectric  and  other  stakeholders  on  electricity's  contribution  in  achieving  both 
sustainable development and greenhouse gas reductions.  Developing energy services is 
recognised  as  fundamental  to  these  objectives  and  this  linked  to  improved  supply 
technology,  greater fuel  switching  and  increased  use  of non-fossil  fuels  will  lead  to 
substantial reductions in emission levels. 
Taken together reduction potential from the electricity sector reflects improved end-l!se 
efficiency thus reducing overall demand, and greater production efficiencies. 
On  the  end-use  side  tliere  are  numerous  ways  to  improve  efficiencies,  both  in  the 
industri<d  and  in  the  domestic  and  tertiary  sectors.  Refrigerators,  computers,  TV's, 
washing machines, light bulbs are only a few examples where use of  existing technology 
will allow the same level of service with much less energy consumption. Electric motors 
used extensively in industry can similarly be  improved. The EU has already developed 
mandatory  energy  efficiency  labeling  scheme  for  the  principal  "white  goods"  and 
mandatory standards for refrigerators/freezers to improve efficiency. The Commission is 
now negotiating standards on a more extensive product range with the relevant industrial 
sectors. 
Likewise on the supply side the overall thermal efficiency of exisiting fossil  fuel power 
plants in the EU was around 38% in 1994 compared with new power plants that typically 
offer efficiencies  of around  or even  above  50%.  There  is,  therefore,  some  scope  for 
reducing  C02  emission  through  an  accelerated  closing  of low  efficiency  old  plants. 
Additional reductions will result from switching from coal to natural gas as planned in 
several Member States.  Combined heat and power production could further add to the 
reduction  possibilities.  It  is  estimated  that  increasing  co-generation's  share  of EU 
electricity production from the present level of 9 % to  18% in 2010 could save up to 150 
Mtonnes of  C02  • 
The  Commission's  believes that doubling  the· share  of renewables  in the  EU energy 
consumption from the present 6% of overall energy consumption to  12% in 2010 while 
being a challenge to the electricity industry is a realistic target. Windpower and increased 
use  of biomass  in electricity  generation  are  the most competitive uses of renewables. 
Without at least half of  the increase in renewables taking place in the electricity sector the 
12% is not likely to be met. The experience from Denmark where installed wind power 
capacity  is  coming  close  to  1  OOOMW  and  accounts  for  around  5  %  of electricity 
consumption is a convincing example that th~ Commission's objective is not unrealistic. 
A recent Commission Green Paper has underlined that the realisation of  this potential will 
require strong  measures  such as  access of renewables to  grid  systems,  obligations for 
renewable  energies,  increased  payments  for  renewables  and  financial  engineering  in 
favour of renewables. A forthcoming White paper will set out the Commission's policy 
6 direction for the future development. of renewables, together with a comprehensive and 
detailed action plan. Publication is planned by  the end of  this year. · 
Most of the possibilities for reduction in emissions contained in the Commission Staff 
Working Paper have, at least in a qualitative way, been accepted for a number of  years.  It 
is equally true that in certain areas technological development has increased the potential 
or brought down the cost of a number of technical solutions to  a more acceptable cost 
range. 
It is however disappointing that the use of  most available climate friendly technology has 
been modest. Low energy prices and expectations of  this continuing is an important factor 
in explaining this.  The fact that up-front investment is more important than long term 
overall cost for both industry and private consumers is another part of the explanatiqn. 
The result is that despite the cost of  different measures varying considerably there already 
exists a large amount of "no-cost" or "low-cost" possibilities to reduce greenhouse gas 
emissions. 
Conclusion: 
In conclusion, what part of this greenhouse gas emission  technical reduction potential 
can be tapped depends on what levels of economic, social or political cost are deemed 
acceptable. Work carried out so far shows that it is possible to identify technical reduction 
possibilities for reducing C02  emissions of 800  Mtonnes. This would be sufficient to 
achieve a 15% reduction of C02 emissions by 2010 compared to 1990 instead of the 8% 
increase  in  this  gas  foreseen  in  the  business-as-usual  scenario  in  Table  I.  When 
implemented  with  the  right  mix  of cost- effective  policies,  this  technically  feasible 
reduction potential can become both economically manageable and political acceptable. 
Table II  gives estimates of the potential C02  emission reductions possibilities  for  the 
main sectors in the EU. It is estimated that there are C02 emission reduction possibilities 
of  around 300 Mtonnes in the power sector, 180 Mtonnes in transport, 200 Mtonnes from 
the end user sectors and 1  00 Mtonnes from renewables. The Commission underlines that 
these reductions in C02 emissions will be a challenge,for the political decision makers. 
The quantities reflect the implementation of a series of policies ·and measures similar to 
the ones suggested in the following  chapter.  For each sub-sector, the  reduction that is 
achievable depends on the detailed formulation of  the measures. 
The Commission Staff Working Paper sets out in more detail the measures that will have 
to be taken to achieve these C02 emission reduction possibilities. 
7 Table II - Estimates ofpossible potential C02  emission reductions (Mtonnes C02)  per 
sector in EU  ·. 
Sector  Emission Reduction 
Possibilities 
. Transport 
of  which  180 
- passenger car  100 
- intermodal shift  50 
- other measures  30 
Industry  100 
Energy Industry  20 
Domesticff  ertiary  100 
Renewables/Heat  100 
Power generation  300 
of  which 
- fossil fuel switching  50. 
- cogeneration! thermal 
efficiency  150 
- renewables/electricity  100 
TOTAL  800 
4.  Elements for a Climate Change Strategy 
A successful climate strategy needs to be comprehensive, cost-effective, technically and 
politically  feasible  and  avoid  negative  social  or regional  side  effects  from  the  policy 
necessary  to  implement it.  This  Communication does  not aim  at  prescribing  such  as 
strategy in detail but, attempts to outline the possible elements for a successful strategy. 
The development of a full  strategy will  only  be possible when the  result of Kyoto  is 
known.  · 
Any EU strategy while being effective in meeting the interim targets also needs to initiate 
a process of  technological and behavioral changes that curbs the growing greenhouse gas 
emissions  and  sets  them on  a  sustainable  paths  which will  meet  the  requirement  for 
continued reductions at and  beyond 2010.  That implies  the  need  to  address  both the 
emission intensity of economic activities as well as the growth in demand for goods and 
services which trigger the increase in greenhouse gas emissions. 
The  choice  of the  right  strategy  with  the  right  mixture  of instruments  is  not  only 
important from  the technical or economic point of view,  it  is  the  core of the political 
challenge of making progress to  protect the global climate. In the development of this 
strategy it will be necessary to ensure that  t~e action is taken in the right way, - both to 
ensure  a  cost-effective  strategy  and  to  avoid  negative  social,  equity  or regional  side 
effects from policy implementation. 
8 The  Commission is  therefore  convinced that a  comprehensive  strategy that  brings  all 
these elements together is a top priority. The Commission has already tabled a number of 
_ proposals including: 
- the  Communication  - Energy  Dimension  of Climate  Change
1  and  the  Council 
Conclusions on it in which the Council invites the Commission to come forward with 
an action programme in the energy  sector to  address  climate change in the energy 
sector in the context of  common and co-ordinated policy measures 
- the extension of SAVE II to the year 2000 with a budget of 45  Mecu and a proposal 
for an AL  TENER II programme 
- a proposal  for Rational Planning Techniques in the supply and demand cycle 
- a Communication setting out a strategy for reducing C02 emissions from cars 
- proposals, in the context of the Common transport policy, for the  revitalisation and 
liberalisation of  the railway sector and for European Rail Freight Freeways, in order to 
encourage the shift of  freight from road to rail 
- a proposal for a Council Directive to  restructure the Community framework for the 
taxation of  energy products (COM(97)30) 
- a proposal for Fifth Framework Programme for RTD covering the period 1998 to 2002 
for which an overall amount of 16.3 bn Ecu is proposed. 
The Commission, however, is convinced that proposals on the table and in the pipeline 
are not sufficient to  meet the targets proposed by the EU and depending on the outcome 
in  Kyoto  will  make  additional  proposals that will  reduce  significantly  C02  ,  some of 
which are  already listed in the  working programme, to  complete the strategy that will 
allow the EU to meet its post-Kyoto commitments. Additional proposals could be: 
- a proposal  aimed at significantly  increasing the  share of renewable energies in the 
EU's energy consumption by 2010 along the  lines spelled out in the Commission's 
recent Green Paper 
- a proposal to increase significantly by 2010 the share of cogeneration - the production 
of  electricity and heat- in the EU's electricity production 
- a series of actions regarding standardization, harmonisation and  liability to  promote 
/  intermodal freight transport 
- revision of the Trans-Europe Network guidelines to  integrate strategic environmental 
considerations 
Com (97)  196 final of 14.5.97 
9 proposals to significantly improve the overall thermal efficiency of  power plants; 
increased penetration of  co-generation would be a particular effective way to 
improve thermal efficiency. 
In  addition  potential  exists  for  developing  a  comprehensive  approach  to  promote 
sustainable  consumption patterns  with a  positive  impact  on climate  policy  goals.  To 
facilitate such reorientation of  consumer behaviour and choice, it is necessary to promote 
consumer awareness and to provide them with appropriate education, reliable information 
and adv,ice. 
A  c:omprehensive  strategy  calls  for  the  use  of a  broad  range  of policy  instruments. 
Traditional regulatory measures will play a role in some cases (examples of regulation 
are,  banning  the  use  of HFC's for  self chilling  cans,  higher efficiency  standards  for 
certain  electrical  equipment).  However,  in  many  areas  more  flexibility  for  economic 
sectors offers obvious advantages. 
Economic incentives - positive as well as negative - are one way to secure a high level of 
flexibility and can often achieve an objective more rapidly and at a fraction ofthe cost of 
regulation. 
In this context it is important to be aware that the use ofjiscal incentives does not imply 
higher  taxes  overall.  In  areas  already  subject  to  taxation,  incentives  can  be  created 
through differentiation (as  was  done to  promote lead-free gasoline).  Switching the tax 
burden  from  labour  to  energy  and  carbon  intensive  production  is  a  revenue-neutral 
possibility likely to  reduce barriers and to  increase the acceptance by the  consumer of 
cost-effective technologies. 
Some of the key challenges will be to  identify and to  implement policy measures that 
allow  the  exploitation  of energy  efficiency  improvements  in  the  existing  stock  of 
buildings  and  equipment.The social  discount rate  employed  is  the  one used  in  public 
policy decisions. Private discount rates can of  course be higher. For this reason measures 
are needed  to  bridge the gap between the social rate of return and  t~1e private rate of 
return used by business and commerce when they take their investment decisions. 
There are  also  other market based options  such as  changes in the current structure of 
subsidies.  The present trend for phasing out subsidies on energy products such as  coal 
should be continued and accelerated where this brings benefits for emission reduction. At 
the same time using short-term and temporary subsidies to encourage renewables or clean 
technologies is an additional option available. 
Negotiated  agreenzents  between  public  authorities  and  specific  industrialized  sectors. 
These offer, in principle, maximum flexibility for industry to act in a cost-effective way. 
The  Commission has  recently  issued  a  Communication outlining  the conditions under 
which Negotiated Agreements would be useful instruments. 
Technical options used to  achieve the EU  emission reduction objectives up to 2010 are 
mainly  based  on  existing  technologies.  The  role  of  new  technological  research  and 
development is limited for this time horizon. Additional efforts are needed to diminish the 
10 cost  of existing  advanced  technologies  given  that  at  present  they  are  not  always 
competitive. 
Furthermore,  socio-economic research  is  necessary,  in  order to  understand  better the 
barriers . to  the  application  of available  technologies  to  realise · emission  reduction 
possibilities  and  organisational  aspects  of the  integration  of new  technologies.  The 
impacts of economic instruments both at the micro and sectoral levels and the condition 
for behavioural change (including consumption patterns) also need to be researched. 
In relation to  RTD,  it is  very  important to  underline  the need  for  continued  focused 
research that will assess the socio-economic and ecological. impacts of climate change 
(especially at the regional  level) and will  develop the necessary technical solutions to 
reduce greenhouse gases beyond 2010 and to cope with possible adverse impacts. Su.ch 
research efforts could also be an advantage for EU competitiveness and lead to improved 
opportunities for EU exporters of  such technologies. 
Above,  many  possibilities  for  reducing  emissions  in  the  EU  have  been  identified.' 
However,  the  implementation  pf measures  to  capture  this  potential  and  to  reduce 
emissions, particularly above the normal rate of equipment replacement, is  unlikely to 
take  place  in  the  absence  of strong  action.  No  one  instrument  will  be  sufficient  for 
achieving the Community's emission target. It will require a combination of  actions. 
Any  policy  or strategy  must,  therefore  ensure  the  broadest  possible  co-operation  and 
acceptance  of all  stakeholders:  government~, industry,  trade  unions  and  the  public  at 
large.  Several  sectors of society and several  regions of Europe will  have to  cope with 
significant changes if an overall 15% reduction of greenhouse gas emissions in the EU is 
to  be  achieved  over  the  next  13  years.  Options  that  have  a  favourable  benefit  on 
employment and economic growth should be pursued. 
While liberalization is generally conducive to  higher efficiency it is  less supportive of 
investments that pay off in the long-term rather than in the short-term. The globalization 
of capital markets have been followed  by expectations from  investors of rapid profits 
from  invested capital.  The  profitability of the  more  cost-effective  measures  to  reduce 
C02 emissions, however, often need longer periods to pay back the investment. This is a 
problem that will have to  be addressed politically as part of the implementation of any 
future  strategy.  Investors  need  the  certainty  of a  firm  commitment  to  reductions  to 
persuade them to invest in cost-effective efficient measures. 
Policies to break the growth trend in emissions will have to 'attack' the problem from two 
sides. They will have to reduce the emission intensity of  relevant economic activities, and 
they will have to curb growth in demand for goods and services triggering the emission of 
greenhouse gases. In consequence, the environmental success of any strategy will depend 
.  on these policies' ability to stimulate the necessary technological and behavioral changes. 
Their  political,  economic  and  social  success  will  depend  on  their  economic  and 
distributional implications. To this end, a least-cost strategy, based on a multi-gas, cross-
sectoral and multi-country approach, not yet developed in detail, should be pursued. 
11 5.  Economic Implications 
Even a comprehensive strategy based on a least-cost approach is not costless but comes at 
a  price.  Production processes  and  products  will  have  to  be  adjusted  to  become· less 
polluting or fuel and energy consuming, new technologies will have to be developed, and 
the  dissemination  of existing  cleaner  technologies  will  have  to  be  accelerated,  the 
replacement of old  and  pollution  intensive  production  facilities  by more  modem and 
environmentally  friendly  capital  stock  will  have  to  be  accelerated  and  consumption 
patterns and  habits will  have  to  be changed.  All this  entails  costs:  resource costs for 
developing and implementing new technologies, adjustment and distributional costs for 
adjusting to an altered framework for supply and demand and for  different demand and 
supply dynamics and other welfare costs resulting from an interference in production and 
consumption  decisions  to  limit  greenhou'se  gas  emissions.  This  will  make  the 
implementation of  such a policy a challenging process. 
However, most of  the above cost components will at least partially be compensated for by 
cost savings: investing in a more fuel and energy intensive production process or product 
will lead to fuel and energy savings
2
, reducing excessive use of fertilizers in agriculture 
will reduce input costs. Moreover, a reduction in the demand for polluting products and 
services  frees  financial  resources  for  alternative  uses.  The  wider  emission-reducing 
technology is spread the more likely will it be that economies of  scale come into play and 
substantially reduce mitigation and resource costs, potentially putting in place a virtuous 
circle.  Most efforts will also have secondary benefits:  reducing the use of fertilizers  in 
agriculture will also  be  beneficial for the quality of groundwater;  reducing demand for 
traffic  services  will  also  improve  ambient  air  quality;  reducing  noise,  congestion and 
accidents, or reducing fuel consumption will contribute to less acidification. It should be 
noted  that  the  total  ·environmental  benefits  that  can  result  from  avoided  ecological 
damage of adverse climate impacts (with associated social  and  economic benefits) are 
difficult  to  calculate  accurately.  It is  essential,  h~wever, that  they  are  taken  into 
consideration in the overall assessment. · 
The costs: 
· Estimating the net costs of  a strategy to combat greenhouse gas emissions would require 
detailed  and  reliable  information  on  mitigation  costs,  preferably  at  the  individual 
enterprise  level,  for  the  whole  economy,  and  across  all  relevant  greenhouse  gases. 
Moreover, the degree and effects of  adjusting production and consumption patterns in line 
with the planned policy objectives would have to  be  quantified as  would welfare costs 
resulting from  interferences into production and consumption patterns. The same holds 
2  Indeed, replacing an old coal-fired power plant by a plant based on combined cycle gas 
turbine production is normally a win-win situation for both the environment and the power 
generator, investing in a car with improved fuel efficiency comes at zero lifetime costs for the 
car-owner in Europe as long as the investment costs of  the efficiency-improvirg technology 
are not too high. 
12 for  offsetting  cost  savings  and  side  effects.  Finally,  the  different  cost  components, 
including offsetting cost reductions and resource savings do not necessarily match over 
sectors, regions or in time. Typically, policy measures require substantial investment in 
mitigation technologies or changed demand patterns before resource cost savings, side 
benefits and the core benefit~ can be enjoyed. Also sectors and firms providing mitigation 
technologies or benefiting from  changed consumption behaviour are not identical with 
those who have to invest in cleaner production. 
This  information  is  not  yet  available· on  a  sufficiently  detailed  and  broad  scale. 
Nevertheless, there exist numerous efforts to  quantify the overall  costs connected to a 
policy aiming  at a reduction in greenhouse  gas  emissions.  These estimates are  using 
bottom-up  and  top-dpwn  approaches,  often  based  on  partial  information,  simplifi_ed 
assumptions,  and  often  reflecting  only  paris  of the  economy  and  economic  effects. 
Notwithstanding these shortcomings, they give a first rough impression of the issues at 
stake, quantified in money terms. 
For  a  15%  reduction  in  C02  emissions  compared  to  1990  estimates  of the  direct 
compliance costs related to energy supply/demand mitigation actions 
3 range from around 
15bn Ecu to about 35 bn Ecu annually by 2010. This corresponds to roughly 0.2 and 0.4 
%of GDP in the year 2010. This estimate is based on C02 alone since adding methane 
and  nitrous  oxide  is  not expected  to  alter this  drastically
4
•  A  cost-effective  multi-gas 
strategy could even be somewhat less costly. The lower cost figure assumes that a part of 
the reduction can be achieved through zero or low net cost measures, "i.e.  resource costs 
related to  the  introduction of more efficient mitigation technologies are expected to  be 
(almost) totally paid off through fuel  and energy savings over the life cycle. The lower 
cost  estimates  are  also  based  on  the  assumption  that  the  political  decision-making 
process manages to pursue the cost-effective solutions for reducing C02 emissions, i.e. to 
pursue  those  policies  which  allow the  reduction  target  to  be  met  at  least  costs.  This 
requires that C02 is reduced by those quantities and in those countries and sectors where 
it can be done more cheaply. 
Figure 1 depicts the annual direct compliance costs (in 201 0) as a function of  the 
emission reduction compared to 1990. A reduction of 15% compared to 1990, when 
effected in a least cost way, might cost between 15 bn and 30 bn Ecu, depending on the 
model. POLES ·estimates suggest costs of30 bn Ecu (35 bn Ecu if  the emissions are not 
based on the least-costs). Costs are high also because  POLES assumes a 15% increase in 
C02 emissions compared to the 8% increase in emissions in the pre-Kyoto scenario. The 
results of  PRIMES are only available for reductions of  up to 12% in emissions. If  these 
results are extrapolated to a 15% reduction in emissions a similar range of  costs is 
obtained compared to other models . 
3 
4 
The Commission Staff Working Paper provides more details on this and the following. 
The Commission Staff Working Paper provides more detail on this. 
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5 and are based on existing technologies. 
New technologies and the. exploitation of substantial economies of scale once there are 
prospects for fast growing markets for these technologies ma'j reduce mitigation costs. 
Moreover,  work under IPPC has recently confirmed that the possibility to apply Joint 
Implementation  could  significantly  (up  to  50%)  reduce  the  overall  cost  figure.  The 
Community has actively supported Joint Implementation in the protocol negotiations and 
there  is  evidence  that  a  number  of industrialized  countries  such  as  the  Associated 
Countries, can offer relatively cheap C02 reduction potential. 
Similarly,  emission trading  in  principle  offers  scope  for  overall  cost  reduction.  It is, 
however, important to make sure that an eventual emission trading system will be set up 
in such a way that it ensures that the overall reduction objectives are met. 
The  assessment of the  macro-economic  impact  shows  wider ranges.  While  the direct 
static effects, as a result of higher resource cost, are  negative, the overall impact, when 
considering  the  traditional  multiplier  effects  are  much  more  difficult  to  predict  and 
depend to a large extent on the policy. package chosen. The Commission Staff Working 
Paper reports on different studies that have tried to  assess overall costs. Not all studies 
have taken the 15 % reduction by 201 0 as their basis. Estimates in available studies range 
from a positive impact on GDP of  close to  1 % to a negative impact of up to  1.5 %. That 
implies that  the  absolute  GDP  level  might be  1.5%  lower with than without  climate 
policy. These observations are in line with a recent report from World Resources Institute 
(WRI) and with the IPPC second assessment report.  Positive impacts can occur if the 
Poles and  Primes results are based on a 8%  discount rate and CRASH91  uses 5%  to 8%  ( 
depending on the country). These are discount rates that are usually applied for public 
policy decision making . Similar discount rate levels arc used in AUTO-oil and the 
acidification strategy and recommended by  international organisations such as  the OECD. 
Private discount rates might of course be higher. 
14  . revenues or carbon/energy taxation (or the  revenues  from  selling tradable permits) are 
used  in  a  effective  ways,  such  as  reducing  labour  costs  for  employers  or  giving 
investment tax credits. 
It is  important  to  note  that  in  spite  of the  uncertainty  none  of the  cost  figures  are 
disturbingly high compared to the overall GDP, or compared to the expected 50% growth 
in GDP between 1990 and 2010. 
The  underlying  assumption  for  the  EU  policy  on  climate  change  is  that  other 
industrialized  countries  undertake  comparable  commitments  to  cut  greenhouse  gas 
emissions. With unilateral action in the EU alone, the changes in industrial structure and 
costs would be much larger.  Energy-intensive industries would relocate to  outside the 
EU. Moreover, energy consumption in the EU might fall but rise elsewhere (since glooal 
energy prices would fall).  As a result carbon dioxide emissions in the rest of the world 
would  increase  (carbon leakage)  which would partially undo the efforts of the EU to 
reduce global emissions. 
The benefits: 
The benefits of any clim.ate  strategy are  difficult to quantify in monetary terms. This is 
especially so  because of the global and  inter-generational nature of the climate change 
issue.  Further complications arise because of  the difficulties of  attaching money values to 
categories' such as ecological preservation and human health impacts. 
The benefits, both primary and secondary, of emission reduction are often less obvious 
and·  the  cost  estimates  mentioned  above  neglect  the  positive  economic  primary  and 
secondary  benefits  from  reduced  damage  due  to  less  air  pollution.  Estimates  of the 
primary (climate) benefits depend on the assumptions made on discount rates,  climate 
sensitivity, the reference point for the emission.s and the weight attached to  damage in 
developing countries. Accounting for all these factors suggests that the global benefits of 
a 15% reduction in C02 emissions in the EU would be between 0.3bn and 101 bn Ecu /yr. 
These estimated benefits are for the world as a whole and only part of them will benefit 
the  EU.  The  large  range  of estimates  for  the  benefits  mainly  depends  on the  value 
attached to damage occuring in the distant future.  If  this value is very high (the discount 
rate is zero) damage in the future is worth as much as damage now.  If the value is low 
(e.g. a discount rate of 10 %) the value of 100 Mecu of damages in 50 years ahead would 
be worth less than 1 MEcu now.  The choice is basically political . 
The above estimate does not yet reflect the avoided damage costs (secondary benefits) 
due to the reduction in other pollutants. The strategy would not only reduce greenhouse 
gases  but  would  also  reduce  sulphur dioxide,  nitrogen  oxides  sulphur and  particulate 
emissions compared to  current legislation by  15% to  25% if not more.  The associated 
benefits  (on  mainly  human  health,  agriculture  and  infrastructure  damages)  can  be 
estimated  to  be at least 11 bn to  32 bn Ecu. In addition; the reduction in C02 emissions 
15 would  also  cut  the  annual  compliance  costs  from  the  Commission's  proposed 
acidification strategy by at least 4 bn Ecu each year. 
The total (primary and secondary) benefits related to the reduction in greenhouse gases 
are difficult to express and quantify in monetary terms. Available estimates suggest that 
these might range from  15 to  137 bn Ecu per year. This estimate taken together with the 
direct  compliance costs,  would  imply  that  the  proposed  emission  reduction· co~ld on 
balance bring net benefits if  one attaches a high value to damage in the far future. 
Improving overall the allocation of resources, e.g.  through a better restructuring of tax 
systems  will  tend  to  have,  positive  overall  effects  on  employment.  C02  emission 
reductions  are often  linked  to  the more  labour intensive solutions,  i.e.  imported fuels 
could be replaced by  domestically-produced  mitigation technologies.  Although this_ is 
difficult to quantify in  general tenns, it has 'to be  an  important element in the detailed 
elaboration of  a climate change strategy after Kyoto. 
Finally,  it  is  necessary  to  emphasise  the  strong  case  for  collective  action,  first  and 
foremost  by  the industrialised  countries.  Unilateral  action  would  imply  that the  EU 
would carry the full  costs of the policy alone.  At the same time other countries would 
benefit  without  having  contributed  to  the  solution.  Coordinated  action  ensures  that 
environmental costs and benefits for the EU would be better balanced. Joint action with 
other industrialized countries is therefore essential to overcome the imbalance that would 
be created by  unilateral  action and  is  the  only  way  that the  parties  can  ·arrive  at  an 
effective climate policy. 
Conclusion 
Although the overall costs might look to be relatively manageable at the aggregate level, 
costs could be substantially higher at the disaggregated level, e.g. for specific sectors and 
could  have  a  significant  impact  on  their  international  competitiveness  if  other 
industrialised countries do not take on comparable commitments. The extent to which the 
costs  are  politically  and  socially  acceptable  depends  on  the  'Yillingness  of society  to 
invest in a European policy that addresses global warming. This will crucially depend on 
the commitments of  other industrialized countries described in chapter 7.  Joint action is a 
condition for a proper balance of  costs and benefits for all countries concerned. 
Mitigation costs differ between economies, regions, sectors and firms, and also between 
greenhouse  gases.  These  differences  and  the  numerous  leverage  points  and  policy 
measures for reducing greenhouse gas emissions make the choice of the policy mix and 
the  geographical  coverage  of a  comprehensive  climate  policy  a  crucial  issue.  Policy 
makers  should  struggle  for  implementing  a  policy  mix  which  achieves  the  aimed-at 
emission reduction at least cost. This holds both domestically and internationally. The 
more instruments and measures are available and the broader the geographical coverage 
the cheaper and the more politically acceptable a cost-effective strategy will tum out to 
be.  Moreover, common and co-ordinated policies and measures could open a new and 
less  costly  vector of cost-effective policies,  inter alia  because  it would  make policies 
globally more environmental efficient, e.g. through limiting the risk of  carbon leakage. 
16 6.  Other Greenhouse Gases 
Methane is  the  second  most  important  greenhouse  gas  in  the  EU  basket.  In  1990 
agriculture accounted for 45 %, waste 32 % and energy 23  % ofEU methane emissions. 
Calculations, referred to  in the Commission's Communication on methane (COM (96) 
557), indicate that in  2010 compared to 1990  a reduction of  methane emissions of  up to 
13% to 15% is feasible with current policies. A reduction of  40% over the same period is 
estimated  to  be  the  maximum  technically  feasible  assuming  that  significant  policy 
changes are made. 
The  costs  of this  extra 25% reduction of CH4  (  from  around· 15% to  around  40% ), 
equivalent to around 100 Mtonnes of  C02, can be estimated at around 20 to 30 Ecu/tonne 
of C02  equivalent reduced which gives an annual cost of around 2bn Ecu to  3bn Ecu. 
However,  this additional25% methane reduction may allow C02  to be reduced by 12% 
instead of 15%. It should be noted that this additional 25% reduction  assumes a 60% 
reduction of methane emissions in the waste sector and reductions of 34% in agriculture 
and energy . As far as agriculture is concerned, further analysis is required to ensure that 
only such measures are pursued that are technically feasible,  politically acceptable and 
consistent  with  other  policy  objectives.  It is  therefore  uncertain,  how  much  of the 
reduction potential of  me.thane above 15 % will actually take place. 
Policy measures aiming at improved treatment of waste, methane recovery in new and · 
existing landfills, best available recovery techniques in coal mines, minimising emissions 
in the production on-shore and  off-shore of oil and  natural  gas  and minimum leakage 
standards and more frequent control of gas pipelines need to be pursued. For agriculture, 
a better storage and treatment of  animal manure is a promising option and there is a need 
for  analysing  how  the  Common  Agriculture  Policy  (CAP)  and  Rural  Development 
policies  can  assist  such  a  development,  for  example,  in  the  form  of incentives  or 
investment aid for covered manure storage combined with biogas utilisation, notably at 
larger intensive animal production units.  Research into the  possibilities  for  improved 
feeding of animals should also be encouraged in the Community's agricultural research 
programme. 
Emissions  of Nitrous  oxide,  N20, in  1990  amounted  to  0.9  Mtonnes,  equivalent  to 
around 300 Mtonnes of C02  Reductions in N20  emissions from  industry, in particular 
the nylon producing sector, which accounts for a third of total N20  emissions can lead to 
a reduction of 30% in N20  emissions in the year 2010. N20  emissions from energy use 
(power stations) are expected to remain stable up to  2010 since most new power plants 
are likely to  be gas fired  and the lower N20  emissions will more than offset growth in 
electricity  production.  N20  emissions  from  agriculture  are  estimated  to  fall  due  to 
reduced  fertilizer  use  and  this  trend ·should  be  further  assisted  by  enhancing  the 
agricultural component of the  CAP in the context of Agenda 2000 . The reductions in 
these sectors will more than offset increases from transport due  to  catalytic converters. 
Consequently, estimated reductions in N20  could be between 70 to 95 Mtonnes of C02 ( 
equivalent). 
17 The reduction of N20  ( 0.285 Mtonnes) could cost around 120 Ecu/ton of N20  or 0.36 
Ecu/ton of  C02 equivalent , in total 0.03 bn Ecu. As regards policy instruments, steps can 
be  taken  to  ensure  that  as  regards  emissions  from  industry  agreements  cover  all 
producers.  In agriculture, increased support should be given to environmentally friendly 
farming practices, such as best practice in fertilizer use. In the energy sector intensified 
research to reduce N20 emissions from fluidised bed combustion of fossil fuels needs to 
be pursued and improved catalytic technology is required in the transport sector. 
' 
7.  All industrialized countries must be committed to comparable action 
Implementing reductions in greenhouse gas emissions that will imply significant changes 
in production and consumption pattern, is not possible for individual countries or groups 
of  countries  such  as  the  European  Community.  Many  industries  operate  in  ·an 
environment with increasing global competition where relatively small cost margins are 
important. More and more economic sectors compete for capital in a global market where 
short term profit is important. And several important industrial sectors in Europe have 
faced or are facing overcapacity that make changes difficult to achieve. 
Experience  with  the  implementation  of the  Climate  Convention  since  Rio  makes  it 
evident that only in a global regime of  shared responsibility and comparable· commitment 
will it be possible to change the trend in emissions which is mecessary.  This is why the 
EU proposal is a negotiation position and nett a unilateral coinmitment. It is based on the 
assumption that other industrialized countries must and can act in the same way and it is · 
linked to  the  proposal to  identify  common and co-ordinated policies and measures  to 
achieve the targets. It has been argued that agreed common and co-ordinated policies and 
measures  will  reduce  the  flexibility  for  parties  to  the  protocol  in  implementing  their 
commitments. The EU position is  based on the belief that in some cases  : global co-
ordination of  policies and measures makes it easier to pursue cost-effective solutions and 
it reduces the political resistance to take action that will easily be seen as applying to only 
some parties to the protocol. 
It is important to underline that the potential for C02 emission reductions identified in the 
EU for achieving the proposed EU target by 2010 are available to  other industrialized 
countries  as  well.  Significant  improvement  in  fuel  efficiency  in  cars  and  electricity 
consumption in appliances can be achieved throughout the world. Higher performance of 
fossil fueled power plants or accelerating the use of renewables can also be achieved as 
well as improved energy efficiency in industry. 
It is also clear that many of  these measures can also apply in developing countries. There 
is  reason  to  believe  that  even  without  legal  commitment  by  developing  countries,  a 
significant carry-over effect is  likely to be observed. Fuel efficiency of cars is basically 
decided by international producers based in Europe, US and Japan and cars exported  to 
or produced in countries outside these countries will  not continue with higher specific 
fuel consumption. The same will hold true in several other areas. 
8.  Developing Countries 
18 The  Climate Convention,  as  well  as  the  Berlin Mandate,  recognise  that industrialised 
countries  must  take  the  lead  in  reducing  greenhouse  gas  emissions.  Industrialised 
countries emission accounted for 75% ofglobal emissions in the base year 1990 and on a 
per capita basis C02 emissions in industrialised countries are on average 10 times as high 
as in developing countries. 
It is  also  generally  true  that  the  ongoing  and  expected  development  in  developing 
countries  is  likely to  lead  in  future  to  much  higher  emi~sions from  these  countries, 
although on·a per capita basis most developing countries will remain well below emission 
levels in industrialised countries. 
The answer to  the  challenge  is  three  fold.  The  first  answer  is  a  reinforcement of the 
obligation  on  indu~trialised  countries  to  act  now.  Only  through  political  and 
technological leadership will it be possible to 'create a situation that will bring developing 
countries closer into the global process. 
The second answer. Both greenhouse gas emissions and the economic capability to limit 
or reduce greenhouse gas emissions vary enormously among developing countries.  It is 
important, therefore,that the more developed among the developing countries gradually 
assume bigger responsibilities when their level of development justifies it.  There is  no 
room  for  free  riders  on  this·  issue.  This. reflects  the  fact  that  both  greenhouse  gas 
emissions and the economic capability to limit or reduce greenhouse gas emissions vary 
enormously among developing countries. 
Finally,  if the  industrialised  countries  apply  and  develop  technologies  that  have  low 
greenhouse gas emissions in order to meet their emission reduction commitments many 
of these -are  also  likely  to  be  applied  in .  the  developing  countries  in  reducing  their 
emissions.  The  Commission  recognises  that  to  facilitate  this  technology  transfer  the 
Community will need to focus and to expand its technical and financial cooperation with 
the developing countries. 
9.  Conclusions 
In conclusion the Commission underlines: 
- that the potential future damage and cost resulting from anthropogenic climate change 
makes it im~erative to urgently reduce greenhouse gas emissions 
- that industrialised countries must continue to take the lead 
- that  the  emission  reduction  targets  are  technically  feasible  and  economically 
manageable in the EU  only if all industrialised countries make  comparable reduction 
efforts  · 
that many of the measures identified within this Communication for a cost-effective 
strategy, are equally applicable to other industrialised countries 
19 - that the  choice of the  right  mixture  of instruments  is  essential  for  a cost-effective 
climate strategy. 
that given the political challenge and the need for action, the involvement of all parts 
of  society will be needed. 
- that the Commission will develop a more detailed Climate Change strategy after the 
emission reduction commitments have been agreed  in Kyoto 
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